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In contemporary democracies police are 
increasingly exposed to public scrutiny. One 
reason for this is the proliferation of technologies 
such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) and cell 
phone cameras. In recent years, CCTV and cell 
phone videos, exposing apparently unjustified 
police actions, have often circulated on social 
and traditional media, notably in the United 
States (US), but increasingly in South Africa 
too. Accountability legislation and oversight 
architecture, and laws promoting public access 
to state information also increasingly compel 
police to share information. Police could 
embrace such transparency as a means to build 
This article discusses two research projects that have used the Promotion of Access to Information 
Act (PAIA) to analyse protest in South Africa and the policing thereof. A total of 23 information 
requests were submitted on behalf of the two projects, 19 to the South African Police Service (SAPS) 
and four to the Independent Police Investigative Directorate. The article starts by discussing police 
transparency in South Africa, information on the policing of protest that the SAPS routinely publishes 
in its annual report, the PAIA framework, and some of the limitations of the projects. It then focuses on 
insights into SAPS information on levels of protest and protest-related violence in South Africa that 
emerged from the two projects. This includes information disclosed by the police regarding their use 
of force during protests, and police accountability for this. The article concludes by reflecting on the 
implications of and lessons from these exercises in police transparency. 
trust and cooperation with civilians and civil 
society groups;1 however, they do not always 
welcome scrutiny and may be resistant to 
transparency. This possibly reflects what Joshua 
Chanin and Salvador Espinosa call a ‘preference 
for reticence’ motivated by ‘[m]istrust of the 
media and scepticism about the motivations of 
the information-seeking public’.2   
Related to the fact that protest is often linked to 
political conflict and social divisions in society, 
the policing of protest is a source of controversy 
in many countries. As a result, police may be 
wary about opening themselves to scrutiny 
around it.3 In South Africa, protest is a key issue 
of public concern and debate.4 Public Order 
Police (POP) are the key component of the 
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South African Police Service (SAPS) responsible 
for dealing with protest, especially where there 
is violence or the risk thereof. Scrutiny of POP 
in South Africa has intensified in recent years in 
the wake of a series of deaths during protests 
and strikes, most notably at Marikana in August 
2012, where police shot and killed 34 striking 
miners and wounded 76 others.5 Protests on 
university campuses in September and October 
2016 involved widespread disruption of teaching 
programmes and some incidents of violence by 
protestors. Police action on university campuses 
in response to this protest also became a 
source of heated contention, particularly in 
relation to some incidents in which excessive 
force was allegedly used.6 In brief, when and 
how public order policing is practiced in South 
Africa remains contentious. 
This article focuses on the intersection between 
police transparency and the policing of protest 
in South Africa. Researchers have started using 
freedom of information (FOI) laws to access 
SAPS information on crowd incidents and 
public order policing. It discusses two projects 
that have used the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act (PAIA) to obtain information 
on protest and its policing. It focuses on key 
insights gleaned from the data regarding 
protest numbers and the use of force by police 
during protests. The conclusion reflects on 
SAPS compliance with PAIA, the unsatisfactory 
quality of some of the information that has been 
disclosed, continued official reliance on this 
information, and the implications of the two 
research projects discussed in this article for 
how the SAPS understands transparency.    
Police transparency in south Africa  
Evaluations of an organisation’s transparency 
often focus on how it responds to requests 
for information lodged under FOI laws. For 
instance, reports by a civil society network 
in 2013 and 2014 indicated that the SAPS 
had responded positively to less than 50% 
of requests that were submitted to it.7 But 
assessing degrees of transparency is not only 
about an organisation’s willingness to disclose 
information but also about whether the 
information is reliable, accurate and up to date. 
A 2007 assessment of the SAPS in relation to 
‘indicators of democratic policing’ noted that 
the standard of reporting in the SAPS’s annual 
reports was relatively good, compared to that 
of many other government departments.8 
However, the auditor-general has consistently 
raised questions about the reliability of 
information on the SAPS’s performance against 
set indicators provided in its annual reports.9 
The system through which the SAPS releases 
crime statistics has also frequently attracted 
criticism. This is partly because when crime 
statistics are released, they are already six 
months out of date.10 
Information routinely provided on public 
order policing
The SAPS’s annual reports consistently 
include information on the number of POP 
units, the number of members of these units, 
the procurement of public order equipment, 
public order training, and arrests during crowd 
incidents. In addition, the section on POP 
consistently provides data on two categories 
of ‘crowd related incidents’ distinguished as 
either ‘peaceful’ or ‘unrest’.11 The data comes 
from a database of incidents to which POP 
units have responded, known as the Incident 
Reporting Information System (IRIS). Table 1 
provides IRIS data on these two categories of 
incidents from April 2011 to March 2016. 
Many people assume ‘public order policing’ 
means the policing of protest, and interpret 
the data on crowd incidents as data on 
protests in South Africa (see Alexander et al. 
in this issue of SACQ).12 This misreading is 
reinforced by the limited supplementary data in 
SAPS reports on such incidents. For instance, 
the 2015/16 SAPS annual report refers to 
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‘peaceful incidents’ as including ‘assemblies, 
gatherings and meetings’. ‘Unrest-related 
incidents’ are said to include ‘labour disputes, 
including the mining sector, dissatisfaction 
with service delivery by local municipalities, 
demarcation of municipality borders, but also 
in the transport and education sectors’.14 This 
does not explain whether the crowd incidents 
recorded were all protests. A further persistent 
source of confusion is the tendency of both the 
public and senior police to interpret the statistics 
on ‘unrest’ crowd incidents as statistics for 
violent protest.15 Some have suggested that 
police deliberately misrepresent IRIS data, and 
that they do so to present an inflated picture 
of levels of violent protest, thereby potentially 
feeding into a situation where the state is seen 
as justified in stifling dissent.16   
The Promotion of Access to 
Information Act
PAIA gives effect to the right of public access 
to information provided for in Section 32 of the 
constitution. The act obliges a ‘public body’ 
(the act also has provisions regarding private 
bodies) to provide access to ‘records’ that it 
holds if these are requested. This is subject to 
specified grounds for refusal and procedural 
requirements.17 The act therefore provides 
access to ‘records’ that are already held in one 
form or another, rather than imposing a general 
obligation to provide information. The act also 
provides that public bodies must publish a 
manual to inform members of the public about 
how to submit PAIA requests to that body.18 
Both the SAPS and the Independent Police 
Investigative Directorate (IPID) publish this 
information on their websites.19 
PAIA distinguishes between records that may be 
requested and those classified as ‘automatically 
available’.20 For instance, according to the 
SAPS PAIA manual, ‘National Instructions’ 
are automatically available.21 This means that 
requests for them do not have to be evaluated 
in terms of PAIA criteria and they can simply be 
provided to the requestor. 
Information requests on the 
policing of protest
In 2014 and 2015, the Freedom of Information 
Programme at the South African History Archive 
(SAHA) submitted 23 information requests 
to the SAPS and IPID on behalf of the two 
research projects discussed in this article. These 
requests resulted in the release of 95 records. 
The records that have been released are 
available online on the SAHA ‘PAIA Tracker’.22
Social Change Research Unit, 
University of Johannesburg
Three of the PAIA information requests were 
submitted on behalf of the Social Change 
Research Unit (SCRU) at the University of 
Johannesburg. The first of these was submitted 
in March 2014. The unit has researched protest 
in South Africa since 2009 and the requests 
were submitted in line with this interest.23 These 
three requests sought information from IRIS and 
resulted in 43 records being released. The most 
notable of these requests was submitted in 
2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Peaceful 10 832 10 517 11 601 12 451 11 151
Unrest   1 226   1 882   1 907   2 289   3 542
Total 12 058 12 399 13 508 14 740 14 693
Table 1: SAPS reports of ‘peaceful’ and ‘unrest’ crowd incidents, April 2011 – March 201613
Source: South African Police Service, 2016.
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October 2014 and resulted in the release of 
34 records containing IRIS data in nine 
categories, including all incidents in the 
crowd management ‘peaceful’ and ‘unrest’ 
categories, spanning 17 calendar years from 
1997 to 2013. The SCRU’s analysis of this 
data represents a significant breakthrough 
in understanding protest in South Africa (see 
Alexander et al. in this issue of SACQ).  
Open Society Justice Initiative
Twenty other PAIA requests were submitted to 
the SAPS and IPID in terms of an international 
comparative ‘transparency audit’ under the 
auspices of the Open Society Justice Initiative 
(OSJI), a programme of the Open Society 
Foundation.24 The audit was carried out 
simultaneously by locally based researchers 
in Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa and the 
United Kingdom.25 Questions were agreed 
on through consultation between researchers 
and were organised around the themes of 
preparedness of police forces, policing in 
practice, and the oversight and accountability 
of police forces in respect of the policing of 
gatherings and protest.26  
Of the 20 requests submitted in South Africa, 
16 were to the SAPS and four to the IPID. 
Requests submitted to the SAPS resulted in 
the release of 47 records. Those to the IPID 
resulted in the release of five records.  
Other PAIA requests on the 
policing of protest  
In addition to these requests, the OSJI project 
also submitted five PAIA requests to five 
municipalities. These were concerned, inter 
alia, with ‘conditions’ that people who are 
planning protests are supposed to comply 
with. The response to these requests is not 
discussed here. PAIA requests linked to the 
policing and regulation of protest have also 
been submitted by other parties.27
information not available or 
that was refused
Records that were released, and which may 
be of interest to people interested in protest 
and the policing of protest, include the national 
instructions on the policing of gatherings, 
National Instruction 4 of 2014 (classified as 
‘automatically available’), training materials, 
SAPS organograms for the Operational 
Response Services division, and others.28 
However, not all of the requests for information 
were successful. 
In terms of Section 23 of the act, where a record 
cannot be found or does not exist, an affidavit 
must be provided to this effect. In response to 
a request for records of disciplinary action for 
police misconduct connected to gatherings, the 
SAPS provided an affidavit from an SAPS official 
stating that he was not aware of any disciplinary 
action being taken against any officers in his 
unit and that he did not know of any cases 
being opened or lodged against any member 
of his unit.29 Some of the issues raised by this 
response are examined in the discussion of 
IPID data on complaints and disciplinary cases 
relating to protest, below. The SAPS previously 
proved unwilling to respond to information 
requests regarding disciplinary action against 
police involved in the Marikana incident.30 
The SAPS did not respond to a query for 
information on shooting incident investigations 
relating to protests.31 In addition to the 
provisions of Section 23, Section 25(3) of PAIA 
provides that, in the event that requests are 
refused, reasons must be provided. However, 
no affidavits or reasons were provided for not 
responding to this query. 
Other limitations of sAPs responses 
The SAPS only released some of its crowd 
management training manuals after an ‘internal 
appeal’ process provided for in the act.32 Apart 
from this, all the records that were released, 
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were released spontaneously. The SAPS 
ultimately provided one or more records in 
response to 16 of the 19 requests, including 
all three of the SCRU and 13 of the 16 OSJI 
requests. However, the records that were given 
did not necessarily contain the sought-after 
information. Requests for records about the 
number of people injured in protests, or about 
complaints received by the SAPS in relation to 
the policing of protest, were not answered in 
a meaningful way.33 A request for information 
on the budget for public order policing was 
similarly unsuccessful. This may in part be 
explained by the formalistic and bureaucratic 
nature of the PAIA process. Information officers 
at public bodies are legally obliged to comply 
with the request for information within the 
framework of PAIA, but this does not extend 
to an obligation to clarify requests that are not 
clearly formulated. It is possible that in these 
cases the information request did not clearly 
set out the needed information.  
Another limitation of the process was that 
some information appeared to be incomplete. 
For instance, a 2011 policy document on 
public order policing indicates that training 
programmes for POP include courses not 
only for platoon members but also for platoon 
commanders, first line operational managers 
and operational commanders.34 But, in 
response to the request for training materials, 
the SAPS only provided training manuals for 
the course for platoon members as well as 
materials on crowd management from the 
basic training curriculum. No explanation was 
given why manuals were provided for some, 
but not all, SAPS crowd management courses.  
iris information provided by 
the sAPs 
The SAPS released a number of records from 
the IRIS system in response to requests from 
the University of Johannesburg’s SCRU. Of 
the records provided in response to the OSJI 
requests, 15 related to the IRIS system. In total 
57 of the 92 records released by the SAPS were 
therefore related to the IRIS system.
The most important set of documents released 
by the SAPS were the 34 records of IRIS data 
on ‘crowd management peaceful’ and ‘crowd 
management unrest’ that were released to the 
SCRU. The records cover 156 230 incidents 
over the years 1997 to 2013.35 Analysing this 
large volume of information presented a major 
challenge to the unit. A team of four research 
assistants was assigned the task of interpreting 
and coding a stratified random sample of the 
incidents.36 Two reports based on the analysis 
of these records have been published.37 
The reason these records are important is that 
each incident record includes detailed ‘notes’. 
These are narrative entries by POP officials. 
The SCRU’s 2016 analysis is based on the 
narratives in these ‘notes’ for a stratified random 
sample of 4 520 incidents over the 17-year 
period. This work shows that the only way to 
systematically distinguish protest incidents from 
other incidents on IRIS is through analysis of 
these notes. There is no other data field on IRIS 
that can be used for this purpose. For example, 
IRIS contains a field for number of arrests, 
but it is not possible to provide the number of 
people arrested during protests without isolating 
protest cases from non-protest incidents 
through a painstaking analysis of the notes 
section on a case-by-case basis – as the SCRU 
has done.
Through its analysis the SCRU has been able 
to make findings on the number of protests 
reflected in the IRIS data for ‘peaceful’ and 
‘unrest’ crowd incidents. Overall figures 
emerging from the SCRU analysis for the 
1997–2013 period are provided in Table 2. The 
SCRU report indicates that there are substantial 
variations from one year to another in the 
percentage of crowd incidents that are protests. 
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The SCRU analysis also engages with questions 
about the focus of protests (but not other 
‘crowd incidents’) during the 1997–2013 period. 
The analysis indicates that 46% were ‘labour 
protests’ and 22% ‘community related’, with 
the balance falling into seven other categories.39 
The SCRU research demonstrates that the 
classification of an incident as ‘unrest’ does not 
necessarily mean that it involved violence. It 
also highlights the need for official systems for 
recording protests to differentiate incidents that 
involve injury to persons or damage to property, 
from those that are disorderly in other ways.40 
It is not clear if IRIS can be modified to address 
these issues, or if an entirely new system must 
be developed. 
Monitoring the use of force 
during protest 
One of the key questions regarding the policing 
of protest in South Africa is about the justifiability 
of police use of force. One OSJI request 
asked for information on the ‘three gatherings 
in relation to which most arrests were made’ 
over the period April 2012 to March 2014.41 In 
response to this request, the SAPS provided 
eight documents containing data from the IRIS 
system on three incidents – allegedly the protest 
incidents during this period at which the largest 
number of arrests were made. The incidents 
were at Woodstock station in Cape Town in 
June 2013 (184 arrests), at the Waterworks 
informal settlement near Randfontein in 
Gauteng in September 2013 (176 arrests), and 
in Aliwal North in the Eastern Cape in January 
2014 (163 arrests). 
The eight documents are of interest partly 
because they seem to provide all the 
information recorded on IRIS on these three 
incidents. The information is broader than the 
nine categories of information in the records 
released to the SCRU. These documents 
indicate that there are about 36 categories of 
information recorded on IRIS. These include, 
for instance, information about the notification 
process (if there is prior notification),42 the route, 
organisations involved, any weapons used by 
participants, the ‘security force’ units involved, 
and ammunition used by them. Many of the 36 
categories include a number of subcategories. 
An interesting aspect of these documents is 
the information on the use of force, including 
the weapons and ammunition used by the 
police. There is no evidence of police use of 
force in the Woodstock incident, but some 
information on the use of force is provided in 
the documents dealing with the Waterworks 
and Aliwal North incidents. Notably, in the 
Peaceful Unrest Total 
Crowd incidents recorded on IRIS 140 604 15 626 156 230
Number of crowd incidents in SCRU sample     2 856   1 654
Number of protests identified by the SCRU in 
sample
    1 173   1 141
Protests as % of incidents in SCRU sample 41% 69%
Estimated number of protests recorded on 
iriS, 1997–2013  56 950 10 800   67 750
Estimated % of all ‘peaceful’ and ‘unrest’ 
crowd incidents on IRIS that are protests  
434%
Table 2: Estimated percentage and number of protests recorded on IRIS according to SCRU 
analysis, 1997–201338
Source: South African Police Service, 2016.
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incident at Waterworks, during which residents 
of the informal settlement used burning tyres 
to barricade a turnoff on the N12 highway, IRIS 
documents indicate that police used close to 
1 100 rubber rounds, five teargas canisters and 
10 stun grenades. However, in the category 
‘person injured as a result of police action’, no 
information is recorded.  
One of the press reports dealing with the 
Waterworks incident records that a woman 
was shot in the shoulder with a rubber bullet.43 
There appears to be no information in the 
public domain suggesting that other people 
were injured during the protest. Nevertheless, 
considering the number of rubber bullets 
used, it is likely that more people were injured. 
In incidents where rubber bullets are used, it 
is possible that force may be used relatively 
indiscriminately.44 It is also likely that those 
injured by rubber bullets would flee from 
police rather than wait to have their wounds 
documented and risk arrest. As a result, it may 
not be possible for police to comprehensively 
record injuries. Nevertheless, one would at least 
expect the police to acknowledge the likelihood 
that some people were injured, even if they 
indicate that the exact number is unknown. 
The Aliwal North documents are, at best, vague 
on the use of force by police. They include no 
detailed information about use of force, although 
there are indications that rubber bullets and one 
stun grenade were used. They also indicate 
that seven civilians were injured and taken to 
hospital, although no explanation is provided on 
how they were injured. 
These documents therefore add to the 
concerns raised by the SCRU about the quality 
of information recorded on IRIS.45 In particular, 
they raise questions about whether IRIS is a 
reliable record of the use of force by police 
during protests. It would seem that IRIS reports 
may downplay injuries resulting from police 
use of force. Concerns that IRIS data may not 
be comprehensive were also raised in a 2007 
report that discussed IRIS data on people killed 
by police during demonstrations.46
Information held by the IPID 
The IPID also provided two documents, with 
overlapping information, on complaints about 
the policing of protests. The documents provide 
information on 68 complaints (11 in 2014 and 
57 in 2015) by members of the public against 
the police. These relate to 52 incidents of 
protest. One anomaly in the documents is that, 
although they are supposed to provide data on 
complaints relating to gatherings during 2014 
and 2015, they contain no cases from Gauteng, 
the province with the greatest population and 
which accounts for more protests than any 
other province.47 They also contain only four 
cases from KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa’s 
second most populous province. This suggests 
that the information comes from a system that 
does not classify and record complaints in a 
reliable manner.
The documents also suggest that there are 
extremely few, if any, cases where complaints 
against police working at protests result in 
a finding against individual police members. 
Among the 69 cases there appears to be only 
one where the IPID concluded that there was 
wrongdoing on the part of the police. In this 
case the report contains no indication that the 
police responsible were identified, or faced 
disciplinary action. Many other cases are closed 
because the police officer allegedly responsible 
for wrongdoing cannot be identified. In others 
the case is closed by the IPID because the 
person laying the complaint is unable to prove 
that they were not part of a group who were 
protesting violently. In effect, complainants, 
some of whom claim to have been bystanders 
who were hit by rubber bullets while in the 
vicinity of protests, carry the burden of proving 
that they were not part of a violent protest. If 
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they fail to do so the IPID places no obligation on 
the police to justify the use of force. 
Along with the absence of information on 
disciplinary action against POP unit members 
described earlier, this suggests that complaints 
that are lodged with the SAPS or IPID are highly 
unlikely to result in disciplinary charges being 
brought against a police officer. Apart from 
general difficulties in establishing the truthfulness 
of complaints, one obstacle would appear to be 
the difficulty of identifying POP members who are 
allegedly responsible for inappropriate force or 
other abuses. If there are members of the public 
who feel aggrieved in public order incidents it 
is likely that, as a general rule, they are unable 
to identify the individual police officer allegedly 
responsible. Even if the SAPS member wears the 
requisite name tag it is unlikely that this will be 
visible to the victim of POP use of force.  
Another issue is highlighted by the IPID response 
when a six-year-old girl was hit by rubber 
bullets while waiting for transport to school. 
The IPID report indicates that the investigation 
had concluded that ‘[i]t is unfortunate that the 
child was at the wrong place at the wrong time. 
There is no evidence to suggest the police official 
intended to injure the child.’48 This is clearly 
inadequate as an assessment of whether the 
use of force by police was appropriate or not. 
The questions raised by the IPID should include 
whether police were aware of the presence of 
children in the area and took sufficient care to 
ensure that they were not harmed. Along with 
the evidence that people injured by POP are 
sometimes bystanders, this raises the question 
whether POP take adequate steps to ensure that 
force is targeted at individuals who are involved 
in violations of the law, rather than against the 
general public in the vicinity of a protest.  
Conclusion 
This article explores the intersection between 
two of the rights provided for in the South African 
constitution: the right to freedom of assembly 
and the right to information. Rather than 
generating their own data, the research projects 
discussed here have used information held by 
government departments, obtained through 
requests for information in terms of PAIA. In 
response to 19 requests lodged on behalf of 
the two projects the SAPS disclosed a total of 
90 records, and the IPID disclosed five. One 
conclusion is that the SAPS responds positively 
to many requests for information. Although 
some requests did not generate the information 
that was sought, this may have been because 
they were not clearly formulated. It is therefore 
difficult to draw firm conclusions about what 
protest-related information the SAPS does not 
have or is not willing to disclose.  
The SAPS exhibits relatively high levels of 
transparency. But many of the key records 
provided indicate that SAPS data on protest 
and how police respond to it have limited 
utility. In combination, the uneven standards 
of data entry, the absence of categories that 
differentiate protests from non-protest incidents, 
and the ambiguity of the unrest category, may 
lead one to conclude that IRIS mystifies more 
than it explains. There is a need for information 
that more readily lends itself to analysis of 
how the legal framework regarding protest is 
interpreted and applied by police.49  
The IPID also responded positively to the PAIA 
requests it received. But the IPID data did not 
include any cases from Gauteng, the province 
with the highest annual number of protests. This 
suggests that the data does not reflect all cases 
of protest that the IPID receives. 
It remains unclear why senior government 
officials repeatedly present the IRIS data 
on crowd incidents as data on protests.50 
If this does not demonstrate a deliberate 
misrepresentation of the data, it indicates 
that there is confusion about what the data 
represents, even at senior levels within the 
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SAPS. It also indicates that SAPS data on 
protests and police responses to protests must 
be improved. 
Better quality information is necessary in 
order to evaluate demand for, and resourcing 
of, public order police. It is also important to 
better understand when, why and how force 
is used in public order policing. As shown in 
this article, the SAPS is limited in its ability 
to answer questions on these issues. It also 
shows that mechanisms for holding police 
accountable for the use of force during 
protests are inadequate. This is sometimes 
due to the fact that individual police officers 
accused of abusing force cannot be 
identified, and sometimes because the criteria 
that are applied in assessing officers’ use of 
force are inadequate.
One argument in support of police transparency 
is that sharing information with the public 
may lead to ‘police data being analysed in 
new ways’, leading to insights that were not 
previously available.51 A further argument is 
that sharing information can build familiarity 
and trust in communities, and promote 
organisational legitimacy.52 However, according 
to US security expert Brian Jackson, ‘making 
more data available to the public is a strategy 
for improving police-public trust’. But, ‘that 
strategy will work only if the data is trusted’.53 
The exercises in transparency discussed in this 
article do indeed reveal the SAPS’s willingness 
to respect laws governing transparency. 
They have also provided an opportunity for 
conducting new analyses of data held by the 
SAPS. However, these exercises reveal serious 
shortcomings in the SAPS, and expose it as 
an organisation that is uninformed about the 
nature of protest and its own responses to it. 
It therefore highlights one risk of transparency 
for the police: that their inadequacies may be 
exposed, resulting in their being subject to 
increased criticism. Hopefully the SAPS, IPID 
and others will continue to recognise the value 
of providing data to members of the public in 
compliance with South Africa’s FOI laws. But 
transparency will better contribute to trust only
if the quality of the information provided can 
be improved. 
This article has been written as part of a project 
on police transparency funded by the Open 
Society Justice Initiative. PAIA requests in 
South Africa were submitted by the Freedom of 
Information Programme at the SAHA. Thanks to 
Sandy Coliver and others involved in the OSJI 
project, Toerien van Wyk, Catherine Kennedy, 
Imraan Abdullah, Thomas Crankshaw and 
others at SAHA, as well as the SAPS and IPID 
officials involved, for their assistance.
To comment on this article visit 
http://www.issafrica.org/sacq.php
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